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Abstract— In this paper we study models and coordina-
tion policies for intermodal Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand
(AMoD), wherein a fleet of self-driving vehicles provides on-
demand mobility jointly with public transit. Specifically, we first
present a network flow model for intermodal AMoD, where we
capture the coupling between AMoD and public transit and the
goal is to maximize social welfare. Second, leveraging such a
model, we design a pricing and tolling scheme that allows to
achieve the social optimum under the assumption of a perfect
market with selfish agents. Finally, we present a real-world case
study for New York City. Our results show that the coordination
between AMoD fleets and public transit can yield significant
benefits compared to an AMoD system operating in isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRAFFIC congestion is soaring all around the world. Be-sides mere discomfort for passengers, congestion causes
severe economic and environmental harm, e.g., due to the
loss of working hours and pollutant emissions such as CO2,
particulate matter, and NOx [1]. In 2013, traffic congestion
cost U.S. citizens $124 Billion [2]. Notably, transportation
remains one of a few sectors in which emissions are still in-
creasing [3]. Governments and municipalities are struggling
to find sustainable ways of transportation that can match
mobility needs and reduce environmental harm as well as
congestion.
To achieve sustainable modes of transportation, new mo-
bility concepts and technology changes are necessary. How-
ever, the potential to realize such concepts in urban envi-
ronments is limited, since the available infrastructures (e.g.,
roads and subway lines) and their capacity are given and
mostly fixed. Thus, mobility concepts that use the existing
infrastructure in a more efficient way are sought. Concepts
focusing on mobility-on-demand services are particularly
promising. Herein, two main concepts exist. On the one hand,
free floating car sharing systems strive to reduce the number
of private cars in city centers. However, these systems offer
limited flexibility and are generally characterized by low
adoption rates. One reason for this is the low vehicle avail-
ability due to the difficulty of rebalancing empty vehicles
to counter asymmetric customer demand. On the other hand,
ride-hailing systems aim to enhance and extend the service
of taxi fleets. However, current studies show that ride-hailing
services can worsen traffic congestion significantly due to the
heightened demand and vehicle-miles traveled by customer-
empty vehicles. Additionally, the low cost and the point-
to-point nature of ride-hailing services may lead both to
an induced demand and a demand shift from other modes
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Fig. 1. The intermodal AMoD network consists of a road digraph, a
walking digraph and a public transportation digraph. The colored dots denote
intersections or stops and the black arrows represent road links, pedestrian
pathways or public transit arcs. The grey dotted lines denote geographically
close nodes while the grey arrows are the mode-switching arcs that connect
them.
of transit, as is currently the case for Manhattan. Indeed,
recent studies for the Manhattan area revealed the massive
magnitude of this issue: From 2013 to 2018, the number of
for-hire vehicles exploded from 47’000 to 103’000, 68’000
of which are employed for ride-hailing services. Due to this
increase, the average traffic speed dropped by 13% from
6.5 mph to 4.7 mph [4].
Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) systems hold
promise as a future mobility concept in urban environments.
AMoD systems comprise a fleet of robotic, self-driving
vehicles that transport passengers between their origins and
destinations. A central operator runs such systems by assign-
ing passenger requests to vehicles and computing rebalancing
routes for the unassigned empty vehicles, in order to re-
align their geographical distribution with the transportation
demand. Thus an AMoD system can replace a conventional
taxi, car sharing, or ride-hailing fleet, while offering several
advantages compared to the previously discussed concepts:
First, no relocation costs for drivers arise; second, much
higher vehicle utilization rates can be achieved compared to
car-sharing systems thanks to continuous rebalancing; third,
the centralized control of the complete fleet allows for more
operational flexibility and efficiency compared to ride-hailing
or taxi fleets where a central operator can suggest, but not
directly control, vehicle routes, and enables the operator to
adopt fleet-wide routing strategies to mitigate congestion.
However, operating an AMoD system to cover the complete
transportation demand of a city would inexorably increase
the number of operated vehicles and cause congestion again
due to induced demand for transportation, as customers shift
from public transit to shared cars. For an AMoD system to
be efficiently deployed, it must intelligently cooperate with
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other modes of transportation, such as the public transporta-
tion network, in order to secure sustainable and congestion-
free urban mobility. Against this backdrop, our study aims
to develop modeling and optimization tools to assess and
realize the benefits of the intermodal transportation system
shown in Fig. 1 that combines public transit with AMoD.
Related literature: Our work contributes to three different
research streams, namely: i) AMoD systems, ii) congestion
pricing, and iii) multimodal passenger transport. In the
following, we review these research streams in turn.
A number of approaches to characterize and control
AMoD systems in isolation are available, ranging from
queuing-theoretical models [5] to simulation-based models
[6]–[8] and multi-commodity network flow models [9], [10].
Queueing-theoretical models capture the stochasticity of the
customer arrival process and are amenable to efficient control
synthesis. However, their complex structure makes it difficult
to capture the interaction with other modes of transporta-
tion. Simulation-based models capture transportation systems
with very high fidelity but are generally not amenable to
optimization. Network flow models are amenable to effi-
cient optimization and allow for the inclusion of a variety
of complex constraints. Accordingly, they have seen wide
use in problems ranging from control of AMoD systems
in congested road networks [9], to cooperative control of
AMoD systems and the electric power network [11], and
control of human-driven MoD systems [12].
Congestion pricing in general has been widely investi-
gated, for instance by analyzing Pigovian taxes for network
congestion problems [13], but only few approaches focus on
pricing in the context of AMoD: Specifically, [14] focuses on
congestion pricing for self-driving vehicles by incentivizing
socially and environmentally aware travel modes, while [15]
proposes pricing schemes to foster the use of AMoD systems.
However, these studies comprise logit modeling approaches
and rely on agent-based simulations. As such, they assess
the performance of pre-determined intermodal AMoD (I-
AMoD) routing policies. In contrast, our optimization-based
approach identifies the best achievable performance of an
I-AMoD system and enables the synthesis of policies that
steer a system towards such an optimum.
Literature on intermodal passenger transportation is still
sparse. First, studies on the interplay between AMoD and
public transportation exist, focusing either on fluidic [16]
or simulation-based [7], [17], [18] models. However, these
studies focus on the analysis of specific scenarios, as opposed
to the optimization of joint control policies for AMoD
systems and public transit. In general, to the best of the
authors’ knowledge, only descriptive analyses of intermodal
passenger transport exist [19].
In summary, some optimization approaches and control
policies for AMoD systems are available but lack the consid-
eration of public transit. With respect to pricing schemes, ex-
isting studies develop pricing schemes to address individual
externalities (e.g., congestion), but not a single study captures
the interplay between multiple externalities arising from the
synchronization of different modes of transportation. Finally,
there exist no optimization frameworks that are capable
of determining optimal coordination policies for I-AMoD
systems and assessing their achievable performance. In this
paper, by coordination we mean that customer routes are
optimized by jointly accounting for AMoD services and
public transportation services.
Statement of contributions: The goal of this paper is to
introduce a mesoscopic optimization approach for I-AMoD
systems. Specifically, the contribution of this paper is four-
fold: First, we develop a multi-commodity network flow op-
timization model that captures the joint operations of AMoD
systems and public transit. In our model, the objective is to
maximize the social welfare, i.e., to minimize the customers’
travel time together with the operational costs of different
transportation modes. Herein, we also consider congestion
effects. Second, we propose a pricing and tolling scheme
that helps to realize the social optimum in the presence of
selfish actors such as customers and AMoD operators. Third,
we present a real-world case study for Manhattan. Fourth,
we derive managerial insights on the benefits of I-AMoD
systems: Our results show that an I-AMoD system can
significantly reduce travel times, pollutant emissions, total
number of cars, and overall costs with respect to an AMoD
system operating in isolation (i.e., without coordination with
public transit). Interestingly, the resulting pricing and tolling
scheme is aligned with the recently proposed congestion
surcharges for ride-hailing vehicles.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: In Section II we present the flow optimization model
for I-AMoD. Section III derives a pricing and tolling scheme
to steer self-interested agents toward the social optimum.
Section IV presents the case study of Manhattan. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper with a short summary and an
outlook on future research.
II. FLOW OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF I-AMOD
This section introduces a flow optimization approach for
intermodal AMoD systems. In this approach, we consider i)
the assignment of transportation requests to transport flows,
ii) different modes of transportation, iii) capacity limits
which are specific to the transportation mode, and iv) rebal-
ancing activities to re-align the distribution of empty vehicles
with transportation demand. Assuming a centrally controlled
system, Section II-A introduces a generic multi-commodity
flow based optimization approach, while Section II-B details
its objective and Section II-C discusses our assumptions.
A. Multi-commodity Flow Based Optimization Approach
To represent the transportation system and its different
transportation modes, we use the digraph G = (V ,A ) shown
in Fig. 1, which has a set of vertices V and a set of
arcs A ⊆ V ×V . The graph contains a road network layer
GR = (VR,AR), a public transportation layer GP = (VP,AP),
and a walking layer GW = (VW,AW). Herein, the road layer
represents intersections i∈VR and road links (i, j)∈AR. The
public transportation layer comprises stops i ∈ VP connected
by arcs (i, j) ∈ AP, while the pedestrian layer represents
walkable streets (i, j) ∈ AW between intersections i ∈ VW.
Finally, mode-switching arcs out of set AC⊆VR×VW∪VP×
VW connect the pedestrian layer to the road and public trans-
portation layers, respectively, whereby VR ∩VP = /0. These
arcs model the customer’s ability to switch transportation
modes, for instance by exiting a vehicle, taking the subway
or hailing an AMoD ride. Collecting all definitions, it holds
that V = VW∪VR∪VP and A =AW∪AR∪AP∪AC.
Traversing an arc (i, j) takes on average ti j time units.
For mode-switching arcs such a parameter denotes the time
necessary to switch between two means of transportation,
such as exiting a vehicle, waiting for the bus or hailing
an AMoD ride. To describe congestion we use a simple
threshold model: We denote by cRi j the capacity of each
road arc. When the flow-rate on a road arc is less than
the capacity of that arc, all vehicles are assumed to travel
at free-flow speed, with a corresponding free-flow traversal
time given by ti j. Conversely, when the flow-rate is larger
than the capacity of the road arc, the traversal time is set
equal to infinity. Similarly, we denote by cPi j the capacity of
public transportation arcs. When the flow-rate on a public
transportation arc is less than the capacity of that arc, all
passengers are assumed to travel with a free-flow traversal
time given by ti j. Otherwise, the traversal time is set equal to
infinity. The customer flows on walking or mode-switching
arcs are not constrained, as we assume enough space on
sidewalks and in public transit stations.
Let R be the set of all travel requests. Rigorously, a
request rm =(om,dm,αm)∈R is a triple comprising an origin
node om ∈ VW, a destination node dm ∈ VW, and a request
rate αm that denotes the amount of customers per unit time
for each request m ∈M = {1, . . . ,M}. Note that om and
dm lie on the walking digraph. Considering the different
transportation modes, fm (i, j) denotes the flow (i.e., the
number of customers per unit time) on arc (i, j) ∈ A for
a certain travel request m. To account for rebalancing flows
between a customer’s destination and the next customer’s
origin, f0 (i, j) denotes the flow of empty vehicles on road
arcs (i, j) ∈AR.
For a given cost function J that maps the set of flows
{ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·) into the set of non-negative real numbers
R≥0, the I-AMoD optimization problem can be stated as
min
{ fm(·,·)}m, f0(·,·)
J
({ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·)) (1a)
s.t.
∑
i:(i, j)∈A
fm(i, j)+1 j=om ·αm =∑
k:( j,k)∈A
fm( j,k)+1 j=dm ·αm
∀m ∈M , j ∈ V (1b)
∑
i:(i, j)∈AR
(
f0 (i, j)+∑
m∈M
fm(i, j)
)
=
∑
k:( j,k)∈AR
(
( f0 ( j,k)+∑
m∈M
fm( j,k)
)
∀ j ∈ VR (1c)
f0 (i, j)+∑
m∈M
fm (i, j)≤ cRi j ∀(i, j) ∈AR (1d)
∑
m∈M
fm (i, j)≤ cPi j ∀(i, j) ∈AP. (1e)
For a given set of transportation demands (om,dm,αm) ∈R,
we compute the optimal customer flows { fm (·, ·)}m and re-
balancing flows f0 (·, ·) minimizing the cost J in Eq. (1a). The
constraint (1b) guarantees flow conservation for customers,
where 1 j=x is a boolean indicator function. We enforce flow
conservation for vehicles in Eq. (1c), and capacity limits
for road links in Eq. (1d) and public transportation links
in Eq. (1e).
B. I-AMoD Objective
The general cost function (1a) can be used to capture
different objectives. In this paper, we are interested in
optimizing the social welfare by minimizing the passengers’
travel time and the operational costs incurred by the I-AMoD
system. Specifically, we define commuting costs that depend
on the customers’ value of time and on operational costs
for the AMoD fleet and the public transportation. Herein,
we assume the same value of time VT for each customer,
while costs for the AMoD fleet comprise distance-dependent
ownership costs VD,R to account for maintenance and depre-
ciation as well as energy costs VE. For the public transit
system, we condense all operational costs per passenger
kilometer in the parameter VD,P. Finally, we consider a
quadratic regularization term with a very small weight VQ.
While this regularization term does not appreciably influence
the overall cost, it does ensure strict convexity for the
problem and thus uniqueness of a solution – a key property
that will be leveraged in Section III to design a socially-
optimal pricing and tolling scheme. The social cost is then
defined as
JM
({ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·))=VT ·∑
m∈M ,(i, j)∈A
ti j · fm (i, j)
+∑
(i, j)∈AR
(VD,R ·di j+VE · eR,i j) ·
(
f0 (i, j)+∑
m∈M
fm (i, j)
)
+VD,P ·∑
(i, j)∈AP
di j ·∑
m∈M
fm (i, j)
+VQ ·
(
∑
m∈M
∑
(i, j)∈A
fm ( j, j)
2 + ∑
(i, j)∈AR
f0 (i, j)
2
)
.
(2)
Given the mesoscopic nature of our study, we estimate the
energy consumption of a single vehicle eR,i j > 0, (i, j) ∈AR
assuming that road arcs are traversed at the constant speed
vi j = di j/ti j. Considering electric vehicles with full recupera-
tion capabilities and an overall tank-to-wheel efficiency ηEV,
the energy consumption for a road arc is
eR,i j =
(ρa
2
·Af · cd · v2i j+ cr ·mv ·g
)
· di j
ηEV
∀(i, j)∈AR. (3)
The first term in (3) represents the aerodynamic drag com-
posed by the air density ρa, the frontal area Af, the drag
coefficient cd, and the rolling friction computed combining
its coefficient cr with the mass of the vehicle mv and the
gravitational acceleration g [20].
C. Discussion
A few comments are in order. First, we consider time-
invariant travel requests. This assumption is valid if requests
change slowly compared to the average travel time of an
individual trip, as is often the case in densely populated urban
environments [21]. Second, we adopt a simple threshold
model for congestion. The model is consistent with classical
traffic flow theory [22] and it is adequate for the goal of ef-
ficiently optimizing customer and vehicle routes. Congestion
models offering higher accuracy can be used for the analysis
of specific control policies. Third, the model in this paper
represents customer and vehicle routes as fractional flows
and does not capture the stochastic nature of the customer
arrival process and the residual traffic in the network. These
approximations are in line with the mesoscopic nature of
our study. For real-time control applications, randomized
routing algorithms can be employed to compute integer-
valued flows starting from the fractional flows that yield
near-optimal routes for individual customers [23, Ch. 4]
and new information can be accounted for as it is revealed
through a receding-horizon framework. Fourth, we assume
that each vehicle carries only a single customer. This mode
of operation is consistent with trends in current mobility-
on-demand systems, such as taxis, Uber, and Lyft. The
extension to ride-sharing in AMoD systems is an interesting
direction for future research. Finally, we assume for the sake
of simplicity that all customers have similar preferences in
terms of travel comfort and value of time. However, the
model proposed in this paper can readily be extended to
capture multiple classes of customers, each characterized
by a different preference profile and modeled by a distinct
network flow.
III. A PRICING AND TOLLING SCHEME FOR I-AMOD
The mesoscopic modeling approach presented in Sec-
tion II-A along with the objective function presented in
Section II-B assume an idealized scenario whereby the
objectives of all stakeholders are aligned with the objective
of maximizing social welfare. In reality, customers decide
on their routes so as to maximize their private welfare, i.e.,
minimizing their travel time and the price paid for their trip,
and AMoD fleet operators control their fleet’s operations so
as to maximize their profits.
In this section, we propose a pricing and tolling scheme
to align the goals of selfish agents with the objective of
maximizing social welfare, as defined in Section II-B. Sec-
tion III-A introduces the self-interested agents participating
in the I-AMoD market, while Section III-B details our
pricing and tolling scheme and Section III-C proves that the
social optimum coincides with an equilibrium induced by the
proposed scheme.
A. Self-interested Agents
We model the I-AMoD market as a perfect market with
three classes of participants: The municipal transportation
authority, I-AMoD customers and AMoD operators. Our
key assumption of a perfect I-AMoD market entails that no
individual customer or AMoD operator is able to unilaterally
influence the transportation prices, which are rather set by
the market equilibrium [24].
The municipal transportation authority monitors the
operations of the I-AMoD system and sets (i) fares in the
subway system and (ii) road usage tolls in the road network
with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Tolls in the
road network may be interpreted as congestion surcharges,
whereas prices in the public transportation network account
for the amortized operational cost of the transportation
system. Specifically, the transportation authority sets a fare
pP(i, j) for each arc (i, j) ∈AP in the public transportation
network and a toll τR(i, j) for each arc (i, j) ∈ AR in the
road network.
I-AMoD customers travel within the network. Each
customer is associated with a request rm and selects an
intermodal route from her origin to her destination. In our
mesoscopic perspective, route selection entails choosing a
commodity flow fm(·, ·) so as to satisfy Eq. (1b). If the
customer decides to travel on public transit, she pays the
price pP(i, j) set by the municipal transportation authority
for each arc (i, j) ∈AP traversed. If the customer chooses to
use the AMoD system for all or parts of her trip, she pays
a fare to the AMoD operator. The fare is composed of (i) a
charge pO (i) associated with the selected pick-up location,
(ii) a charge pD ( j) associated with the destination location,
and (iii) a charge pR(i, j) for each road arc (i, j) ∈ AR
traversed. Given the mesoscopic perspective of our study,
we neglect common user-centric modeling approaches that
account for individual cost functions. In line with current
practice [25], we assume that customers select their routes by
using navigation apps, which compute routes by accounting
for an aggregate model of the customers’ route preferences.
Specifically, we set the customer’s objective as the maxi-
mization of her welfare, defined as the sum of (i) the travel
time multiplied by the value of time VT and (ii) the cost
of her trip as the cumulative sum of the fares paid along
the route. For consistency with the definition of social cost
as given in Section II-B, and to enable the design of a
socially-optimal pricing and tolling scheme, we include the
same quadratic regularization term as in Eq. (2). Formally,
I-AMoD customers solve the problem
min
fm(·,·)
VT · ∑
(i, j)∈A
ti j · fm (i, j)+VQ · ∑
(i, j)∈A
fm ( j, j)
2
+ ∑
j∈VR
pO ( j) ·
(
∑
k:( j,k)∈AR
fm ( j,k)− ∑
i:(i, j)∈AR
fm (i, j)
)+
+ ∑
j∈VR
pD ( j) ·
(
∑
i:(i, j)∈AR
fm (i, j)− ∑
k:( j,k)∈AR
fm ( j,k)
)+
+ ∑
(i, j)∈AR
pR(i, j) · fm (i, j)+ ∑
(i, j)∈AP
pP(i, j) · fm (i, j)
s.t. Eq. (1b), (4)
where (·)+ = max(·,0). The first term in the cost function
corresponds to the customer’s value of time, the third and
fourth term capture the origin and destination charges in the
AMoD network, the fifth term denotes the arc-based charge
in the AMoD network, and the last term is the fare paid to
the subway network.
AMoD operators service customer requests and collect
fares from the customers. The operators also control the
rebalancing vehicles’ routes to ensure that vehicles are avail-
able to service customer requests. Without loss of generality,
we can combine the rebalancing flows for each AMoD
operator into an individual rebalancing flow. Hence, for the
sake of simplicity, for the rest of the paper we will fold
the AMoD operators into a unique operator. A detailed
explanation is to be found in Section III-D.
Tolls τR(i, j) set by the municipal transportation authority
are levied for vehicles for each road arc traversed. Consistent
with the assumption of a perfect market, the AMoD operator
is unable to influence the AMoD prices pO (i) , pD ( j), and
pR(i, j); rather, these prices are determined by the market
equilibrium. Accordingly, the AMoD operator’s goal of
maximizing revenue is equivalent to the goal of minimizing
operating expenses. Again, we include the same quadratic
regularization term in Eq. (2) within the AMoD operator’s
cost to ensure strict convexity. Therefore, the AMoD operator
solves the problem
min
f0(·,·) ∑(i, j)∈AR
(
VD,R ·di j +VE · eR,i j + τR(i, j)
) · f0 (i, j)+VQ · f0 (i, j)2
s.t. Eq. (1c). (5)
B. A Pricing and Tolling Scheme
The subway fares pP(i, j) and the road tolls τR(i, j) can
be considered as steering variables that a public stakeholder
can optimize in order to align the goals of self-interested
customers and the AMoD operator with the objective defined
in Section II-B.
We denote the dual variables associated with the con-
straints in Problem (1) as λC for customers balance (1b), λR
for vehicles balance (1c), µcR for road arcs capacity (1d), and
µcP for subway arcs capacity (1e). We propose the following
pricing and tolling scheme. The subway fares pP(i, j) are set
as the sum of the public transit operational cost VD,P ·di j and
the dual variables of the subway congestion constraint µcP:
pP(i, j) =VD,P ·di j+µcP(i, j). (6)
The road tolls τR(i, j) are set as the dual variables of the
road congestion constraint µcR:
τR(i, j) = µcR(i, j). (7)
C. A General Equilibrium
The following theorem shows that the pricing and tolling
scheme proposed in Section III-B ensures that an optimal
solution to the I-AMoD Problem (1) coincides with a general
equilibrium for the perfect market described in Section III-A.
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal Pricing and Tolling Scheme):
Consider the following prices. The destination charges
pD (i) are equal to the dual variables of the vehicle
conservation constraint λR(i), while the origin charges
pO (i) are set as the opposite, that is,
pO (i) =−pD (i) =−λR(i). (8)
The road arc charges pR(i, j) are equal to the sum of the
vehicles’ operating costs VD,R · di j +VE · eR,i j and the road
tolls τR(i, j), that is,
pR(i, j) =VD,R ·di j+VE · eR,i j+ τR(i, j). (9)
Consider an optimal solution
{{ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·)} to the
I-AMoD problem. Also, consider a perfect market where
self-interested customers plan their routes by solving Prob-
lem (4), a self-interested AMoD operator plans routes for
the rebalancing vehicles by solving Problem (5), and a
municipal transportation authority sets public transit prices
and road tolls according to (6)-(7). Then the AMoD prices
(8)-(9) are market-clearing prices and the optimal solution{{ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·)} is a general equilibrium for the I-
AMoD market.
Proof sketch: The proof relies on showing that satisfaction
of the KKT conditions for the I-AMoD Problem (1) implies
satisfaction of the KKT conditions for the customers’ optimal
routing Problem (4) and the KKT conditions for the AMoD
operator’s optimal rebalancing Problem (5). A rigorous proof
is reported in Appendix A.
D. Discussion
A few comments are in order. First, in the setting of a gen-
eral equilibrium, we assume that the AMoD operators have
no pricing power. That is, no individual AMoD operator is
able to single-handedly influence the fares paid by the AMoD
customers. This assumption holds true in the case where
multiple operators of similar size compete for customers’
transportation demands, and it is arguably realistic in several
urban environments. For reference, no fewer than five app-
based mobility-on-demand operators (Uber, Lyft, Juno, Curb,
and Arro) offer mobility-on-demand services in Manhattan
at the present day. Second, in this paper, the operations of all
AMoD operators are captured through a single rebalancing
flow and a single set of customer-carrying flows on road
arcs for simplicity and ease of notation. However, the model
does not assume that a single AMoD operator is present.
Indeed, a treatment where different operators control differ-
ent subsets of vehicles, each associated with a rebalancing
flow, would result in the same equilibrium. To see this,
note that customers, not AMoD operators, choose which
operator to use by selecting the customer-carrying flows
{ fm (·, ·)}m, and the operators do not compete on prices. For
a given set of customer requests and given road tolls, each
AMoD operator solves a smaller version of Problem (5).
Critically, the optimization problems of different AMoD
operators are not coupled. That is, the decision variables of
each operator do not affect the other operators’ problems.
Thus, solving Problem (5) is equivalent to solving each
AMoD operator’s optimization problem, and the result in
Theorem 3.1 holds true for each individual AMoD operator.
Third, we assume that the routes followed by customer-
carrying AMoD vehicles are set by the customers themselves
through the navigation apps. In practical implementations,
the customers may be able to choose only among a limited
set of possible routes, for example between a direct route
that incurs congestion tolls and a longer, less congested and
thus cheaper route. Such more sophisticated route selection
models are left for future research. Finally, we use the cost
function (4) to model customers’ behavior. Although such
an approach does not entail the level of detail of a user-
centric approach [17, Ch. 4], it suffices for the mesoscopic
perspective of this study.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we assess the performance achievable
by the I-AMoD system in terms of travel time, costs,
and emissions in a real-world case study for Manhattan.
Section IV-A details this case study. Thereafter, we present
the optimal solution for the I-AMoD system in Section IV-B
and compare it to the optimal solution for the AMoD system
operating in isolation in Section IV-C.
A. Case Study
We focus on the Manhattan transportation network in
New York City shown in Fig. 2. The transportation requests
considered are the actual 53’932 taxi rides which took place
on March 1, 2012 between 6 and 8 p.m. in Manhattan
(courtesy of the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission).
The 6’772 origin-destination pairs of the trips are placed on
the pedestrian digraph. We derive the road network from
OpenStreetMap data [26], and define the capacity of each
Fig. 2. Road map and subway lines of Manhattan with exemplary origin-
destination pairs.
street to be proportional to the number of lanes multiplied by
the road’s speed limit. Since taxis constitute only a fraction
of the cars in Manhattan, we set the road capacity available
to the AMoD fleet to be a fraction of the overall road
capacity. Without restricting ourselves to a fixed number, we
perform a parametric study where the scaling factor of the
road capacity is varied between 0 and 10%. The topology
of the walking network is similar to the topology of the
road graph with the key difference that pedestrians, unlike
vehicles, can travel along both directions on every road link.
We connect every node in the road digraph to its equivalent
in the walking network, modeling the customers’ ability to
hail an AMoD ride. We assume the subway network to be
the only public transportation system, in line with the fact
that the subway network is the dominant public transit mode
in Manhattan. This way, we provide a first order assessment
of I-AMoD. We construct the public transportation digraph
using the geographical location of the lines and the stops
found in the NYC Open Data database [27] as well as the
time schedules of the MTA [28]. We connect every node
in the public transportation network to the geographically
closest node of the walking digraph. We set the time to
transfer from a road node or a subway stop to a walking node,
which models the time required to exit an AMoD vehicle or
a subway station, to one minute. We assume that two minutes
are required to go from a pedestrian to a road node and get
into an AMoD vehicle, which is in line with the average time
to hail a ride in Manhattan [29]. The time to transfer from a
walking node to a subway line equals one minute plus one
half of the periodicity of the line.
Table I summarizes the remaining parameters used in
our case study: According to the DOT guidelines, we set
the value of time to 24.40 USD/h [30] and the operational
cost for the AMoD vehicles excluding electricity costs to
0.486 USD/mile [31]. For the subway, the operational cost
per passenger mile is equal to 0.47 USD/mile [32]. We as-
sume the AMoD fleet to be composed of electric lightweight
vehicles and derive their parameters from [20, Ch. 2]. The
cost of electricity is set to 0.247 USD/kWh [33]. We directly
relate the energy consumption to the CO2 emissions based on
the current electricity sources of the state of New York [34].
TABLE I
NUMERICAL DATA FOR THE CASE STUDY
Parameter Variable Value Source
Value of time VT 24.40 USD/h [30]
Vehicle operational cost VD,R 0.486 USD/mile [31]
Subway operational cost VD,P 0.47 USD/mile [32]
Cost of electricity VE 0.247 USD/kWh [33]
Air density ρair 1.25 kg/m3 [20, Ch. 2]
Frontal drag coefficient cd ·Af 0.4 m2 [20, Ch. 2]
Rolling friction coefficient cr 0.008 [20, Ch. 2]
Mass of the vehicle mv 750 kg [20, Ch. 2]
Tank-to-wheel efficiency ηEV 72 % [20, Ch. 2]
Fig. 3. Distance-based modal share for the I-AMoD system.
For each of the scenarios presented in the next Sections IV-
B and IV-C, the quadratic optimization Problem (1) was
solved on commodity hardware (Intel Core i7, 16 GB RAM)
using Gurobi 7.5.2 in less than 10 minutes.
B. Optimal Solution for the I-AMoD System
In this section, we study the performance achievable by
the I-AMoD system by solving Problem (1) for different
levels of road usage. Specifically, a 100% baseline road usage
sets the road capacity to zero, whereas a 90% usage means
that 10% of the empty road capacity is available to AMoD
vehicles. Fig. 3 shows the distance-based modal share for
different levels of road usage, together with the average travel
time, CO2 emissions, and monetary cost JM. As the available
road capacity lowers, the subway utilization increases. With
a further decreasing road capacity the walking distance also
increases because the subway cannot fully replace a point-to-
point means of transportation. Nevertheless, the travel time
and monetary costs remain well contained, while emissions
drop significantly. The left part of Fig. 4 shows an exem-
plary optimal path under a 98% baseline road usage, where
different means of transportation are used. The customer flow
travels with the M line from 5 Avenue / 53 Street to 34 Street
- Herald Square, walks one block, and takes the 3 line from
34 Street - Penn Station to Chambers Street, reaching her
destination by AMoD car.
Fig. 5 shows the road usage and the road tolls τR(i, j) for
the same baseline scenario. The average cost of fares paid
due to tolls along trips corresponds to almost 2 USD, which
Fig. 4. Optimal paths for I-AMoD (left) and AMoD (right). Segments
traveled by car are solid black, by foot dashed black and by subway solid
colored as the corresponding line.
Fig. 5. Road usage and optimal tolls for the I-AMoD system.
is interestingly in line with current proposals to tax mobility-
on-demand vehicles with a congestion surcharge of 2 to 5
USD per trip [35].
C. Comparison with the AMoD System
We analyze the achievable performance of the AMoD
system operating in isolation for the same levels of traffic
as in the previous Section IV-B and compare it to that
of the I-AMoD system. Within our framework, the AMoD
solution is obtained by simply setting the subway capacity
of the I-AMoD system to zero. The “infinite” capacity of
the pedestrian network guarantees feasibility even under ex-
tremely congested conditions. Fig. 6 shows the modal share
in this scenario. As the baseline road usage increases and
the available road capacity decreases, the average travel time
increases due to longer routes and larger walking distances.
The monetary cost follows a similar trend, whereas emissions
reach a maximum due to longer customer and rebalancing
trips before falling to zero when the roads are fully saturated
and all trips are traveled on foot. The right side of Fig. 4
shows an exemplary optimal path with the same origin-
destination pair as the path of the I-AMoD system shown
on the left side. The customer flow walks until reaching a
vehicle which drives her through the FDR to her destination.
Fig. 7 shows the relative decrease in average travel time, CO2
emissions, and monetary cost achievable by coordinating
the AMoD fleet with the public transportation network. As
the road availability decreases, the difference in travel time
and cost increases by more than 40%, while the emissions
get reduced by almost 30%. Fig. 8 shows that due to the
severe congestion constraints, the difference in road usage is
Fig. 6. Distance-based modal share for the AMoD system.
Fig. 7. Relative difference in travel time, cost, emissions. and number of
cars between AMoD and I-AMoD.
minor. However, the higher road tolls would cause an average
surcharge of almost 6 USD per trip, 200% more than for the
I-AMoD system. Overall, I-AMoD results in shorter travel
times, fewer vehicles, and much lower emissions and tolls.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the possibility of coordinating
different modes of transportation in congested urban environ-
ments in order to satisfy travel requests whilst maximizing
social welfare. We presented a multi-commodity network
flow model for an autonomous mobility-on-demand system
that cooperates with the public transportation network. Be-
sides computing optimal customer and vehicle routes, we
designed a pricing and tolling scheme that was proven able
to steer selfish agents to the social optimum under the
assumption of a perfect market. We presented a case study for
Manhattan and we showed that optimizing the customer and
the rebalancing routes by jointly accounting for the AMoD
fleet and the public transportation system can dramatically
reduce travel time, costs, and emissions. The optimal road
tolls computed within our model are quantitatively in line
with the surcharges for ride-hailing trips recently discussed
by the New York City municipal authority and significantly
lower than for the AMoD system in isolation.
This work opens the field for several research directions.
First, we would like to design an operational algorithm to
Fig. 8. Difference in road usage and optimal tolls.
compute the optimal customer and rebalancing routes at the
microscopic level in real-time. Second, it is of interest to
extend our model to capture stochastic effects such as time-
varying congestion, public transportation delays, and variable
customer demand. Third, we would like to combine our
model with a power-in-the-loop AMoD model [11], in order
to investigate to which extent intermodality can improve the
interaction with the electric power grid. Fourth, we would
like to explore more human-centered optimization objectives
such as travel comfort and switch-over costs. Finally, we plan
to study the impact of I-AMoD systems on different cities
with diversely advanced public transportation networks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof: The proof relies on showing that the prices
and tolls (6)-(9) align the incentives of self-interested agents
with the social optimum. Namely, the origin and destination
charges ensure that customers are charged for the amount
of imbalance (and therefore for the additional rebalancing
trips) that their trip induces in the AMoD system; the subway
prices and road prices ensure that customers account for
induced congestion and overcrowding, and operational costs
in their decision-making process; and the road tolls ensure
that a selfish AMoD system operator takes into account the
congestion caused by its vehicles.
Specifically, we show that the optimal solution to the
I-AMoD Problem (1) is also the general equilibrium for
customers and the AMoD system operator if prices and
tolls are computed according to (6)-(9); specifically, if{{ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·)} is an optimal solution to (1) with asso-
ciated prices (6)-(9), then { fm (·, ·)}m is an optimal solution
to (4) for each m ∈M , and f0 (·, ·) is an optimal solution
to (5). Since all three problems are strictly convex, they
are guaranteed to have a unique globally optimal solution.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that satisfaction of the KKT
coditions for the I-AMoD Problem (1) implies satisfaction
of the KKT conditions for the customers’ optimal routing
Problem (4) and the AMoD operator’s optimal rebalancing
problem (5) [36].
The KKT stationarity conditions for the I-AMoD Prob-
lem (1) are:
(
VT · ti j +VD,R ·di j +VE · eR,i j
)
+λC( j)−λC(i)+λR( j)
−λR(i)+µcR(i, j)+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0 ∀m ∈M ,(i, j) ∈AR
(10a)(
VT · ti j +VD,P ·di j
)
+λC( j)−λC(i)+µcP(i, j)
+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0 ∀m ∈M ,(i, j) ∈AP
(10b)(
VT · ti j
)
+λC( j)−λC(i)+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0
∀m ∈M ,(i, j) ∈AW
(10c)(
VD,R ·di j +VE · eR,i j
)
+λR( j)−λR(i)+µcR(i, j)
+2 ·VQ · f0 (i, j)? = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈AR.
(10d)
First, we prove that, if the KKT conditions for Problem (1)
are satisfied, then the KKT conditions for each individual
customer’s routing Problem (4) are also satisfied.
The KKT conditions for customer m’s Problem (4) are
VT · ti j+ pO (i)− pO ( j)+ pR(i, j)+ λ˜C( j)− λ˜C(i)
+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈AR (11a)
VT · ti j+ pP(i, j)+ λ˜C( j)− λ˜C(i)
+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈AP (11b)
VT · ti j+ λ˜C( j)− λ˜C(i)
+2 ·VQ · fm (i, j)? = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈A \ (AR∪AR), (11c)
where λ˜C is the dual variable associated with constraint (4).
Substituting the prices (6)-(9) in the equations above shows
that, if Eq. (10a)-(10c) are satisfied, then Eq. (11a)-(11c) are
also satisfied with λ˜C = λC. Thus, if
{{ fm (·, ·)}m, f0 (·, ·)} is
the optimal solution to Problem (1), then fm (·, ·) is also the
optimal solution to Problem (4) for each individual customer
m for the given prices and tolls (6)-(9).
Next, we turn our attention to the AMoD operator’s
Problem (5). The KKT conditions for Problem (5) are
VD,R ·di j+VE · eR,i j+ τR(i, j)+ λ˜R( j)− λ˜R(i)
+2 ·VQ · f0 (i, j)? = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈AR,
(12)
where λ˜R is the dual variable associated with Eq. (5).
Substituting the road toll τR(i, j) from Eq. (7) shows that,
if Eq. (10d) is satisfied, then Eq. (12) is also satisfied with
λ˜R = λR. Thus, f0 (·, ·) is also the optimal solution to the
AMoD operator’s Problem (5) for a given customer demand
and given tolls.
This concludes the proof.
